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Lindberg v. California Dep't of Education10/31/2005
ication in this record that the jurors were incapable of considering and applying the instructions on liability and malice separately and dispassionately.
Third, we disagree with defendants' suggestion that any time a malice instruction is given, the jury is improperly induced to conclude that the much lower bar of liability has been easily cleared. If such were the case, no judge would ever be permitted to give a malice instruction to a jury also deciding the question of liability--contrary to everyday civil trial practice and custom.
B. Instruction on Criminal Penalties for Willful Destruction of Public Documents
The jury was instructed on the provisions of Government Code section 6200, which prohibits the willful destruction and mutilation of public records by a custodian thereof.
Defendants claim the instruction was irrelevant and prejudicial because this was a civil case involving employment retaliation, and none of them faced criminal prosecution for willful destruction of public documents. They cite two cases--Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 325, 334 (Hyatt) and Stickel v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 157, 169 (Stickel)--to support their claim that instructions on criminal statutes have no place in a civil trial.
Neither case supports defendants' argument. In Stickel, where an inebriated plaintiff collided with a bus, the appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to give an instruction on a criminal statute governing drunk driving, where the jury could have been given an appropriately modified instruction on drunk driving as negligence. The instruction was properly refused because it would have confused the jury on the standard of care. (Stickel, supra, 32 Cal.2d at pp. 162, 169.) Hyatt applies the same principle under a closely similar set of facts. (Hyatt, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at pp. 334-335.)
Unlike the instructions in the above two cases, the instruction here did not confuse the jury about the elements necessary to prove defendants' liability for Lindberg's tort causes of action. It merely educated them that willfully destroying public documents is a criminal offense. The instruction was apposite in light of the evidence the jury received that Polster purchased a shredder outside normal administrative channels and ordered the shredding of documents that were relevant to the CBO fraud investigation soon after they were subpoenaed by the United States Attorney.
It is simply untrue, as defendants suggest, that instructions on violation of criminal statutes have no place in a civil jury trial. "Violation of a criminal statute embodying a public policy is generally actionable even though no specific civil remedy is provided in the criminal statute." (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224.) "It is well established . . . that juries may be instructed upon criminal statutes even when th
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