|
|
Lindberg v. California Dep't of Education10/31/2005
far less qualified. We agree.
"`A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.' (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) An expert witness's testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to a subject `that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact . . . .' (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) A claim that expert opinion evidence improperly has been admitted is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion." (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 131.)
Each of the three witnesses in question was eminently qualified in the field of adult education and had firsthand knowledge of Lindberg's background and experience. Two of them were also familiar with Eileen Calise, and were thus capable of comparing the two as candidates for the position.
As the trial court pointed out, these witnesses' familiarity or lack thereof with respect to CDE's screening and hiring process went to the weight, not the admissibility, of their testimony. No error occurred.
VII. Instructional Error
Defendants cite three instructional errors that they claim substantially affected the verdict and require reversal. We take them up in the order raised.
A. Malice Instruction
In the first phase of trial, the jury returned special verdicts in favor of Lindberg against all three defendants and found by clear and convincing evidence that Eastin acted with malice.
The case then proceeded to a second phase of trial in which the jury decided that punitive damages should be imposed against Eastin in the sum of $150,000. The punitive damages award was eventually stricken by the trial court on a motion for JNOV.
Defendants maintain that because the trial court vacated the punitive damages verdict, a malice instruction was obviously improper. Moreover, they say, the mere giving of the instruction was prejudicial because it unfairly swayed the jury to return a verdict of liability against Eastin.
The argument fails. First, the evidence of malice against Eastin was not trivial or inconsequential. There was evidence she fired at least two whistle-blowing administrators during a period when CBO fraud was mounting and there was circumstantial evidence that she set in motion a plan to neutralize those employees who refused to ignore the fact that unscrupulous CBO's were wasting taxpayer funds.
Second, the jury was instructed to decide all questions of fact by the strength of the evidence; not to be influenced by passion, prejudice or sympathy; and not to single out any particular instruction for special emphasis. We presume the jury followed these instructions. (Plut v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 106.) There is no ind
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Show All Case Laws California PEO
|