|
|
Clifford v. American Drug Stores8/22/2005
deliberated for nearly five days on punitive damages.
We conclude it is probable that the instructional errors "`prejudicially affected the verdict,'" and in combination with the erroneous exclusion of evidence of Clifford's injuries, they have "resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 580-581; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
As we have discussed above, the doctrine of invited error does not prevent reversal, since the court erroneously instructed the jury to determine, as a matter of fact, issues that had already been adjudicated (Lysick v. Walcom, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at pp. 157-158), and failed to give correct instructions upon the fundamental issues in the case. (See Herbert v. Lankershim, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 482; Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc., supra, 141 Cal.App.2d at p. 819.)
1. Admission of New or Irrelevant Evidence
Clifford contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that was not relevant to reprehensibility, that tended to show that Sav-On did not retaliate against her, Carranza, Ryan, or Stange, that its sexual harassment policy was adequate to protect her if she had reasonably followed it, and that Doose did not, in fact, sexually harass her, Carranza, Ryan, or Stange.
Clifford concedes that she did not object each time that such evidence was introduced. A judgment may not be reversed due to the erroneous admission of evidence, unless the record shows that the appellant made a timely objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence and that the specific ground of the objection or motion was stated. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd.(a).) Clifford contends that she sufficiently complied with this rule by making it clear to the trial court "that she was requesting that the evidence in the second trial be limited to a sub-class of that presented in the first phase, precluding any new evidence which might undermine findings of illegality or malice."
Clifford claims that the trial court "understood precisely what was objecting to," because counsel explained that "the outer limits of the evidence that should be admitted in the retrial would be the evidence that was adduced in the first trial. And then it would be up to the court to make a determination of what aspect of that evidence is truly still relevant in this phase of the trial."
As we decipher counsel's explanation, it appears to have been an objection to all evidence not adduced at the first trial, and to all previous evidence that the court might find irrelevant. Counsel's argument was, in effect, a motion in limine to exclude two broad classes of evidence.
A motion in limine to exclude evidence is not a sufficient objection unless it was directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence and was made at a time when the trial court could determine the evidentiary question in
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 Show All Case Laws California PEO
|