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Clifford v. American Drug Stores8/22/2005
on to the compensatory award. (Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 781 (Torres).) But it does not follow that by informing the second jury of the amount of compensatory damages, the nature and type of injuries suffered by the plaintiff become irrelevant.
In its brief on appeal, Sav-On italicizes a portion of language quoted from Torres for emphasis as follows: "`Upon a retrial of the issue of exemplary damages it is only necessary for the second jury to be advised of the amount of general damages already awarded in order that it may maintain a reasonable relation between such damages and the exemplary damages, if any, that it awards.'" (Torres, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. omitted, italics added.) Sav-On successfully urged upon the trial court, and urges here, that this language establishes a broad exclusionary rule.
But the quoted language in Torres merely explained the Supreme Court's ruling that neither liability nor the amount of compensatory damages, once adjudicated by the first jury, need be addressed again by the second jury. (See Torres, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 781.) Placing the emphasis on a different part of the Torres quote demonstrates this: "`Upon a retrial of the issue of exemplary damages it is only necessary for the second jury to be advised of the amount of general damages already awarded in order that it may maintain a reasonable relation between such damages and the exemplary damages, if any, that it awards.'" (Ibid., italics added, fn. omitted.)
Indeed, the court expressly refrained from articulating an exclusionary rule in Torres. In a footnote after the quoted language, the court said, "We note this passage does not restrict the trial court's discretion as to the scope of the evidence that may be introduced at retrial on the proper amount of punitive damages. [Citation.]" (Torres, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 3.) Recognizing this proviso, Sav-On alternatively contends that since the court stated that its language was not intended to restrict the trial court's discretion as to the scope of the evidence, the exclusion of all evidence of Clifford's injuries was "well within the trial court's discretion." Sav-On's argument begs the question.
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, § 210.) A trial court may exclude such evidence pursuant to a proper relevance objection only when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its probable prejudicial effect, or by a substantial danger confusing the issues or misleading the jury. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609; Evid. Code, § 352.)
Dr. Greils, the psychiatrist who examined Clifford in June 1999, at Sav-On's request in her workers' compensation proceedings, testified in the first trial that Clifford was suffering from an anxiety d
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