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Clifford v. American Drug Stores8/22/2005
show by references to the record or calculations that the trial court did not reduce Glick's original claim by approximately $38,000, or what the amount in Glick's amended claim might have signified, or whether it represented Glick's hours or those of other attorneys. If Sav-On wishes us to consider its contention that this figure was not a reduced figure, it was required to support that argument with appropriate argument and references to the record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(C).)
"Appellate courts cannot be expected to assume the task of searching the record for the purpose of discovering errors not pointed out by counsel." (Estate of Randall (1924) 194 Cal. 725, 728.) Thus, we decline Sav-On's apparent invitation to undertake an independent review of its request to reduce the award due to asserted duplicate billings.
Sav-On next contends that the trial court should have reduced the attorney fee award by the amount claimed in connection with the second trial with regard to punitive damages. Citing Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, Sav-On acknowledges that a plaintiff who has succeeded on some, but not all theories in the action, may still be considered a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees, although a partial lack of success may be a factor in determining the amount to be awarded. (See also, Children's Hospital and Medical Center v. Bonta, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 777; Wallace v. Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley, Inc. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 836, 846-847.)
As Sav-On points out, it is within the trial court's discretion to reduce a fee request when a party has had only limited success in achieving the objectives of the litigation. (See Sokolow v. County of San Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 248.) The court may refuse to compensate for time that was "not `reasonably' spent. [Citation.]" (Boquilon v. Beckwith (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1722-1723.)
The party who challenges the trial court's exercise of discretion always bears the burden "`to establish an abuse of discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power.' [Citations.]" (Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566.)
Sav-On has not asserted that the trial court abused its discretion, but merely contends that it should have ruled differently. "`Where the issue on appeal is whether the trial court has abused its discretion, the showing necessary to reverse the trial court is insufficient if it presents facts which merely afford an opportunity for a different opinion: "An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge. To be entitled to relief on appeal from the result of an alleged abuse of discretion it must clearly appear that the injury re
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