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Clifford v. American Drug Stores8/22/2005
e.g., ยง 12940, subds. (h) & (j).) The limitation of actions is set forth in section 12960, subdivision (d), and provides, in relevant part, merely that " o complaint may be filed after the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred . . . ." It does not remove the unlawful character of the employment practice, as stated in the proposed instruction.
A party is entitled only to correct instructions on theories of the case advanced by it and supported by substantial evidence. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572.)
Sav-On contends that it was prejudiced by the complete absence of any instruction to the jury with regard to the statute of limitations.
"`The general rule is that "it is the responsibility of the trial court to instruct the jury on the controlling legal principles applicable to a case. . . ." [Citation.]' [Citation.] The parties are `"entitled to have every theory of [their] case submitted to the jury in accordance with the evidence [citations], and the trial court must, when requested, instruct on all vital issues involved."' However, `". . . an erroneous, misleading or incomplete instruction may be refused by the court, and . . . the latter is under no duty to modify such instruction or give others in its place, `"as long as the jury is properly instructed as to the law of the case."' [Citations.]"' [Citation.] [ ] `That general rule in practical application should not require a party to rely on abstract generalities where the abstract generalities are inadequate to cover the parties' theories of the case, but should result in instructing the jury on the vital issues of the particular case. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Orient Handel v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 684, 698 (Orient Handel), original italics; see Wank v. Richman & Garrett (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1112-1114; Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 717; Jaeger v. Chapman (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 520, 525.)
Case law does not precisely define the contours of the court's sua sponte duty to instruct. Certainly, the duty applies only to matters variously described as "vital issues" (Orient Handel, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 698), to "material issues and controlling legal principles" (Agarwal v. Johnson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 951), or to "the major subjects raised by the pleadings" (Distefano v. Hall (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 657, 672.) Even with respect to such matters, the duty is not absolute. Thus, the court has no duty to instruct where counsel refuses to modify an incorrect instruction, and places the court "in the untenable position of either giving an erroneous or misleading instruction or submitting a version of her own to which counsel had expressly stated its disagreement." (Roberts v. City of Los Angeles (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 625, 635, fn. 11
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