|
|
Clifford v. American Drug Stores8/22/2005
efused her request.
On January 6, 2000, Clifford arrived at work at 8:00 a.m., having taken the train, because she could no longer drive. Smith telephoned at approximately 9:00 a.m., to tell her to come to a meeting in the City of Bell. She told him that she had not been notified about the meeting before and had taken the train in, but Smith told her to find someone to drive her, and he called back repeatedly, demanding that she come to the meeting, because Weber wanted her there. Around noon, Clifford fainted at work and was taken to the hospital. When she was released, her psychiatrist placed her on medical leave and increased her medication. At the time of trial, Clifford was still under a psychiatrist's care, and still depressed, anxious, and withdrawn.
DISCUSSON
I. SAV-ON'S APPEAL
Sav-On's eight assignments of error include the contention that the trial court gave several incorrect jury instructions and erroneously refused others, that Clifford's cause of action is time-barred as a matter of law, and that Sav-On was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of evidence. We begin with the statute of limitations.
1. Statute of Limitations
Sav-On contends that the trial court erred in refusing its proffered special jury instruction on the statute of limitations.
"The timely filing of an administrative complaint is a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action for damages under the FEHA. [Citations.]" (Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 492; see Gov. Code, §§ 12960, 12965, subd. (b).) With two express exceptions not applicable here, no administrative complaint may be filed after the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice occurred. (§12960, subd. (d).) Clifford filed her administrative complaint on July 8, 1998.
At the time of trial in April 2001, unlawful employment practices that occurred more than one year before the filing of an administrative complaint were actionable if they were determined to be continuing violations. (See generally, Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 812-818 (Richards) and Alch v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 339, 368-369.) At that time, California courts recognized two types of continuing violations: one where discrimination is the result of the employer's policy or system that existed more than one year before the filing of the administrative complaint; and another where a series of discriminatory acts were directed at an individual, one or more of which occurred within one year of the filing of the complaint. (See generally, Alch, at p. 368; see e.g. Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 349 (Accardi) [claim timely if any sexual harassment against plaintiff continued into the limitations period]; Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1052-1054 [unlawful practice was the result of di
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 Show All Case Laws California PEO
|