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Cannon v. Mid-South X-Ray Co.2/23/1999
s that the accrual date for a cause of action arose on the date the illnesses were diagnosed by a doctor. Schiro, 611 So. 2d at 965; Edwards, 573 So. 2d at 709. Additionally, the court in Schiro recognized that Schiro knew she had sustained some type of injury within six years of the detection of lung disease. Schiro, 611 So. 2d at 965. However, since the cancer had not been medically diagnosed, Schiro did not actually know what her injury was; therefore, any suit she brought then would have been premature. Id.
. The Dissent in this case would prefer to use the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims instead of the statute of limitations applicable to actions not otherwise specifically provided for under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-49 to deny Cannon's personal injury claim. The Dissent reasons that the judicial interpretation and statutory language of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-36 would limit Cannon to filing her claim within two years of "the date the alleged act, omission or neglect . . . [which] with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered." This assertion might be true if the instant case was a medical malpractice claim. However, it is not. Cannon filed this lawsuit against Mid South and Du Pont for causing her injuries as a darkroom technician, not against medical doctors for malpractice. The applicable statute of limitations found in Section 15-1-36 would allow this case to proceed and the reversal of summary judgment is therefore appropriate. In fact, the Dissent makes the point that this case was not ripe for summary judgment by arguing that a different statute of limitations applies and that Cannon should have known of her injury well before she filed her claim. Under Schiro, the discovery of an injury is an issue of fact to be decided by a jury where there is a genuine dispute such as we have here.
. Cannon, like Schiro, contends that there exists a genuine issue of material fact relating to the defense of the statute of limitations and that such fact is within the province of the jury to decide the time a cause of action accrues. Cannon asserts that her cause of action against the appellees accrued on February 9, 1993, when Dr. McCune told her that exposure to chemicals at her workplace was a major cause of her health problems. The appellees counter that under the applicable statute of limitations, Cannon failed to bring her claim within three years after the alleged injury. Mid-South and Du Pont contend that Cannon should be charged with discovery of her injuries from the time she initially sought treatment for her illnesses between 1980 and 1990. In the alternative, the appellees assert that Cannon knew of the connection between her illnesses and toxic workplace in January 1992 when she read the article about darkroom disease. The appellees tried to support their argument that she knew of her injury and its cause by stating that
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